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Technology advancement is a primary goal for military space development. By staying 
ahead of the competition, space systems can offer unique battlefield capabilities.  A 
number of space programs are increasingly behind schedule, over budget, and 
underperforming. This thesis explains the benefits the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) ring can offer programs 
experiencing technical immaturity or desiring responsive space. By understanding and 
adhering to the ESPA Rideshare Users Guide and the Auxiliary Payload Interface Control 
Document, programs desiring a ride aboard an ESPA-configured EELV will achieve 
greater success and have fewer issues in the launch vehicle-to-satellite integration 
process. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has published many reports 
offering proven process requirements that will result in increasing the odds of program 
success. By studying the benefits an ESPA ring offers, many processes recommended by 
the GAO can be implemented resulting in better cost and schedule performance.  The 
research performed involves launch vehicles and their current state, along with a 
description of rideshare integration. The analytical results, along with findings of 
successful and struggling space programs, are then used to show how the ESPA system 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Operations in outer space have dramatically advanced since the launch of Sputnik 
in 1957. These missions have been so successful that in just a few decades society has 
become dependent on the benefits space assets offer. The navigation, communication, 
and weather monitoring benefits offered by satellites impact everyone’s daily lives. Every 
time a person uses the Internet, pays for gas, processes a bank transaction, or uses a 
navigation system, space assets are relied upon. These assets have become nearly 
transparent in United States society as efficient time-saving resources. Most people do 
not realize the extent to which they rely on space. Even some military members fail to 
appreciate completely their reliance on space. A quote is used in the military community 
in which a Soldier says, “I don’t need space systems; all I need is this little box which 
tells me where to go.” This statement shows how it is possible to forget that the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) is a complex 24+ satellite constellation operating within tight 
orbital and timing tolerances. With the great advances in satellites, it seems launch 
vehicles (LVs) would have changed drastically also, but they have really changed very 
little since the 1960s. The main reason for the apparent lack in evolution of launch 
vehicles is the extreme difficulty and complexity of achieving orbit. When Sputnik 
launched, the satellite itself was not so remarkable; it was a 184-pound basketball-sized 
sphere with a beeping transmitter placed inside. What made the launch so amazing was 
that the Soviet Union created a launch vehicle with enough thrust to push past the bounds 
of earth’s atmospheric drag and accelerate fast enough to achieve stable orbit.  
When discussing today’s launch vehicles, the concept and designs are the same, 
but improvements in engine performance have enabled vehicles to deliver a 47,522-
pound satellite into a Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Such a feat is achieved through a launch 
vehicle that delivers approximately 1,950,000 pounds of thrust at liftoff [1].  For the 
United States, this launch capability is provided by the EELV Delta IV launch vehicle in 




engines on the first stage. The remarkable brute force achievement of entering space was 
and is still accomplished through heavy, high-thrust, highly combustible launch vehicles. 
Just as a highly trained athlete makes sports look easy, launch experts make launches 
look repetitively simple, yet launches continue to be the greatest challenge of today’s 
space missions. Figure 1 is from Major General Ellen Pawlikowski’s article presented in 
High Frontier magazine entitled “Mission Assurance—A Key Part of Space Vehicle 
Launch Mission Success [2].” This figure shows the greatest risk to a satellite occurs 
during launch pad operations, launch, and activation. The risk is so great because 
launches operate in the small space between a controlled explosion and imminent 
detonation. Use of a proven vehicle, such as EELV, can reduce these risks to the 
payloads.   This study examines the launch vehicles currently used and discusses the 
benefits of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adapter 
(ESPA) ring.  The ESPA ring enables a launch vehicle to deliver up to six secondary 






Figure 1.   Notional Risk as a Function of Systems Life cycle [From 2] 
The ESPA ring is being embraced by the scientific community according to Lt. 
Col. Dan Griffith, Director Space Test Program, Kirtland AFB, who said, “there is a lot 
of interest in ESPA across the space community and the interest is growing.  It was 
designed primarily with the science and technology community in mind, but there are 
very obvious potential applications if you have a small operational satellite. No reason 
why they could not use an ESPA ring [3].” The utility of delivering one primary and six 
secondary satellites to orbit offers a greatly reduced cost and brings additional benefits.   
However, it seems the primary payload provider is having a difficult time appreciating 
what ESPA offers due to the perceived increase in system integration complexity 
potentially leading to more mission risk. The goal of this paper is to explain ESPA’s 
benefits and illustrate that once the initial developmental phase passes, the utility of the 
ESPA ring will be as a system integrated standard launch service offering “plug-and-





Figure 2.   ESPA Drawing 
In the middle 1990s, launch vehicle costs were estimated at $9,000 per pound for 
payload to orbit. Thus, if a program wished to launch a 10,000-pound satellite, the launch 
vehicle and integration expenses would be expected to cost $90M. During this time, 
forecasted analysis predicted a drastic increase in demand for launch vehicles. Many 
experts predicted the launch industry to operate 85 launches a year. This drove many 
analysts to predict the cost per pound to drop drastically (to as low as $400 per pound), 
since demand would drive down individual supply costs.  There were projected “demands 
for launch services at prices as low as $400/lb in the 2010 to 2030 time period. The 
number of flights was projected to rise to as many as 250/year; about one per business 
day” [4].  A reduction in launch costs of this magnitude would increase the corporate 
demand for satellite constellations allowing many companies to use satellites as their 
primary programs of development and system augmentation. The exact opposite 
occurred. Companies found terrestrial systems to perform their missions and launch 
vehicles failed to achieve great cost reductions, so the forecasted demand never 
materialized. What produced the greatest setback in launch cost reductions was that many 
activities required to support the enormous forecasted launch demand had already been 
initiated. Launch companies began to spend great amounts of capital to build vehicles and 




under the Air Force initiative called the EELV program, which produced two highly 
capable launch vehicles in the medium to heavy lift arena. The launch vehicles are known 
as Atlas V and Delta IV and are the most robust, highest producing, and capable launch 
vehicles ever designed by the United States. Currently, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
is attempting to find solutions to augment or support the high costs associated with both 
vehicles and their infrastructure. In [5] “Officials specifically cited the unmanned Atlas 
and Delta rockets, saying their costs could soar in the next few years due to underutilized 
industrial capabilities and high vendor overhead.”  Much of the market analysis is 
predicting that costs could double over the next few years [5]. 
The capability of the launch vehicles to integrate and execute missions carrying 
the ESPA ring is only the initial start. The future goal is to make the capability a 
standardized launch service aboard the majority of all missions manifested, which will 
allow many programs to deploy new, faster, smaller satellites into orbit, leading to a 
dramatic increase in technological maturity. With the announcement and activation of a 
new Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office on 21 May 2007 [6], the Air Force 
intends to make space access faster and cheaper. One of the ORS office’s first tasks laid 
out the vision, mission, and goals of the new office. They submitted the 2007 Plan for 
Operationally Responsive Space: A Report to Congressional Defense Committees [7], 
which details the plans for a tier-level execution approach. Along with the ORS office, 
many universities, companies, and corporate programs see benefits in what the ESPA 
ring can offer through penetration of the barriers to launch.  
The ESPA ring not only offers the capability for manifesting science experiments 
and limited-funded programs, but it can significantly accelerate the acquisition process. A 
comparison of today’s satellites to the massive computers of the 1960s reveals much of 
the same limitations in performance, cost, and mass. Following this trend, the future 
generations of satellites should evolve to offer more capabilities in a smaller, greatly 
reduced cost package, similar to today’s desktops. Currently, the typical satellites vary 
from the size of a car to a bus, whereas future satellites will offer the same or better 




more flexible and responsive space assets will bring about a new leap in technology and 
evolutionary advancement. This ability to deliver smaller more responsive satellites 
would change the arena of space. “But the need for systems that don’t take a decade to 
develop and deliver, and can survive an attack, or be quickly replaced, is driving the trend 
toward smaller spacecraft [8].” 
B. PURPOSE 
This research is intended to provide an understanding of the benefits and concerns 
associated with the ESPA ring’s integration into future EELV missions. It will also help 
define the proper steps needed to standardize the ESPA mission integration processes, 
Auxiliary Payload (APL) standardization/testing requirements, and future employment of 
the ESPA system. The research will identify any valid systemic issues associated with the 
ESPA system. Additional objectives include detailing the standardization processes 
required and validating the system for safe deployment of the secondary payloads on a 
noninterference basis with the primary payload, which will benefit U.S. space programs. 
The final objective is to explain the documentation required for ESPA integration to 
assist program managers vying for a ride.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This paper addresses the primary question: Can the ESPA ring be so clearly 
defined and implemented that it becomes nearly transparent to the primary payload, 
making integration simple enough to gain program manager support and offer more 
frequent research and scientific missions to orbit?  Answering this overarching question 
will simultaneously answer each of the following specific research questions. 
• Does the decrease in cost for the secondary payloads outweigh the mission 
integration difficulties?  
• Is it possible for a late APL to be replaced by its mass model without 
causing expensive coupled loads reanalysis? 





• What steps can be developed to make APL integration standardized 
among the smaller satellites? 
• Can timelines be reduced for APL integration to increase responsiveness 
to space? 
• Is it possible to have “hot spare” APLs ready to go in the event a 
manifested APL is not ready without causing expensive launch reanalysis? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study attempts to provide specific recommendations to the U.S. Air Force 
and DoD to utilize the benefits the ESPA ring can offer in the areas of operational 
capabilities, acquisition reform, scientific research, and Technology Readiness Level 
(TRL) advancement. The ESPA ring is currently in the initial phases of acceptance within 
the space acquisition process.  By resolving issues and addressing doubt, this study can 
help the ESPA ring provide the needed progress in scientific research and maturing 
technological development activities before programs attempt to implement them into 
their systems.  
E. SCOPE  
This thesis explains the design and integration of the ESPA ring onto EELV 
rockets. It also discusses the risks and apprehensions of using an ESPA ring, and 
illustrates risk reduction activities, creating a system that is nearly seamless for the 
primary payload. This thesis also explains methods to reduce mission integration risks 
and standardize the requirements of the secondary payloads.  The paper is not scoped to 
discuss in detail the financial expense or corporate direction of space acquisition.  It does 
not examine in detail the differences between the U.S.-built EELV launch systems and 
the European Ariane 5 vehicle, but it will discuss some of the decisions made by the two 
corporations and the lessons learned.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology used to develop this research began with conducting a literature 
review of the objectives and requirements required for successful APL–ESPA–LV 




appreciation for secondary payload challenges can best be addressed.  Furthermore, a 
review of the current documents designed to standardize and simplify the ESPA 
integration became the basis for requirement understanding. Next, a review of the history 
of launch systems was conducted to examine critical occurrences which would reveal 
whether the ESPA ring was beneficial to Assured Access to Space (AATS). A thorough 
review and analysis was then conducted on the current and future missions utilizing the 
ESPA ring, examining the benefits that each mission offered to the scientific and 
government communities. After the previous data was analyzed, a brief review of the 
participating organizations and their involvement in the ESPA development.  All of the 
data was then analyzed from the perspective of the overall and subordinate research 
questions and conclusions were developed.   
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
From this point forward, the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses 
the launch vehicle history and describes some of the events that occurred in the 1990s, 
such as the forecasted booming launch vehicle demand, which failed to materialize. The 
chapter then compares and contrasts the Arianespace Ariane Vs launch vehicle and 
secondary payload adapters versus the EELV launch vehicles and ESPA ring. The 
chapter also contains a review of the current space acquisition programs and processes 
continuing to fall behind cost, schedule, and performance margins. Finally, the chapter 
concludes with a description of the ESPA ring design and satellite configuration 
possibilities, along with a discussion of ORS and Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs).  
Chapter III contains the results of literature research on specific missions, which 
have either used or plan to use the ESPA ring.  It also describes the integration process 
foreseen for the ESPA missions, and it contains the documentation and current program 
offices, which are developing the ESPA policies. 
Chapter IV uses the highly successful CubeSat program as a model for proper 
guideline development. This chapter also takes the space acquisition discussion, literature 





the steps and processes being implemented to make rideshare possible. The documents 
discussed in this section will be the qualification steps ensuring secondary payloads are 
adequately prepared for mission integration.  
Chapter V analyses the current status of the United States Air Force space 
programs and provides recommendations based on the research findings in Chapter IV. 






































II. BACKGROUND ON LAUNCH VEHICLE AND ESPA 
SYSTEMS INFLUENCING THE SPACE ACQUISITION PROCESS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
Before explaining the ESPA system and integration challenges, an analysis of the 
historical evolution of the launch industry, followed by a review of the current state of 
space acquisitions, must be discussed.  It is well known that almost every space program 
initiative is experiencing high cost growth and delays in program milestones [9].  The 
U.S. Air Force heavily funds space programs, which can be broken into Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Weather, Missile Warning, Communication, 
and Navigation missions. In every area, a major failure in program management, cost 
growth, schedule delays, and capability reductions have been experienced within the last 
decade. Three highly visibility programs, which received Nunn-McCurdy breaches due to 
their system costs reaching a threshold greater than 25%, are the Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) program, Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system, and the 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. 
Each of these programs has become an example of the pitfalls involved in an acquisition 
initiative. The intent of an overview of the space acquisition process is to illuminate the 
U.S. and DoD developmental activities and issues in regards to program execution and 
probability of system success. 
Before discussing the state of space acquisitions and ways in which ESPA may 
significantly reduce the cost growth, it is first necessary to look at the launch industry and 
examine what caused the demand for launch vehicles to evaporate and the launch costs to 
skyrocket. In the early 1990s, a strong belief existed that launch demand would continue 
to rise. In 2002, the 1998 launch forecast predicted approximately 80–85 launches would 
occur; and the reality was in the order of 24 launches for 2002. What impacts did the 
forecast of 80–85 launches versus the realized 24 launches cause? The next section 




B. LAUNCH HISTORY AND CURRENT VEHICLE SYSTEMS  
1. History of Launch Systems  
In the early 1990s, many believed the Commercial Space Transportation Alliance 
(COMSTAC) performed highly credible launch forecast initiatives. The results of the 
alliance were reports anticipating launch rates quadrupling the current launch rate for 
geosynchronous orbit (GSO) and non-geosynchronous orbit (NGSO) launches [10]. This 
COMSTAC information led to industry experts foreseeing huge delays and loss of profits 
coming for the current launch systems. Solidifying the concerns were reports outlining 
the deficiencies predicted in launch capabilities for the 21st century. Determined to 
mitigate bottlenecks, initiatives were taken to upgrade and fund new launch systems 
capable of handling the foretelling tempo. This opened a door for the U.S. and European 
launch industries to realize a profit from an industry typically too expensive to properly 
sustain; by gaining the majority of the future market shares, profits could finally be 
realized. 
The COMSTAC report was highly regarded because it was performed by industry 
without the direct intent to persuade.  The authors of the COMSTAC report used realistic 
market data and information to form a legitimate prediction of future launch demands 
[10]. The COMSTAC group was comprised of the Boeing Defense and Space Group, 
General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 
Martin Marietta Astronautics, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, and Rockwell Space 
Systems Division. The study attempted to calculate the launch demand based on current 
satellite developmental activities, which forecasted a major growth for commercial and 
military space systems. Figure 3 is from the COMSTAC May 2008 Commercial Space 
Transportation Forecasts report [10], which shows the trend of launch forecasts from 
1998–2006 compared to the actual data from 2007. When reviewing the 1998 data (note 
arrow), it is easy to see what spawned the race to develop highly reliable, capable, launch 
systems, which would be required to keep up with the demand. If the 1998 data were 






Figure 3.   COMSTAC Launch Prediction [From 10] 
Following an explosion of heavy funding and rapid vehicle evolutionary 
activities, the systems were ready for service. The U.S.-built Atlas V and Delta IV 
vehicles, along with Europe’s Ariane 5, were ready to carry the industry’s satellites to 
orbit. The manifest never grew as predicted. Instead, it left some very expensive vehicles 
and supporting infrastructure performing at only a quarter of their capacity. What 
happened? “It was later determined that many decisions regarding the future use of space 
and how to develop new vehicles to get there [were] based more on wishful thinking and 
overly optimistic technological assessments rather than on rigorous economic analysis” 
[4]. What was believed to be highly regarded data coming from the COMSTAC group 
was actually less financially driven and more “wishful thinking” of what constellations of 
communication, weather, and imagery systems could be. This oversight of not 
considering the business aspect of the customer drove the misdirection for space launch 
capacity. Almost all reports showed the launch industries’ costs decreasing substantially. 
Some forecasted launch costs were as low as $400/lb whereby today’s launch costs range 






[11]. Figure 4 offers a historical illustration to show the capabilities and costs of a few 
international and domestic medium to heavy lift vehicles available during the early 
2000s. [11].  
 
Figure 4.   Global Launch Vehicles Cost Per Pound [From 11] 
With the demand never materializing, these expensive launch vehicles were 
incapable of supporting themselves in a commercial market, which left them on their 
governments’ doorsteps requesting financial support [4]. The U.S. government pays to 
sustain the Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicles through the EELV Launch Capability 
(ELC) contract, which supports the manpower and infrastructure. The ELC contract 
“enables a flexible contract structure in which the government aims to share an 
appropriate level of risk with the launch service providers, preserve the space launch 
industrial base, and stabilize the launch operations tempo” [12]. Europe’s Arianespace 
receives its support for the Ariane 5 launch vehicles from the European Space Agency 
(ESA) and the French government.  
2. Arianespace—Business Model and Strategy 
Acting quickly and determined to reduce launch costs, Arianespace developed 
dual launch and multiple launch configurations for their Ariane 5 launch vehicles. These 




vehicle, thus reducing individual launch costs substantially. Their efforts at developing 
the dual launch capability started off slowly by testing and executing a few dual launch 
manifested missions until the risks could be mitigated and customer uncertainties were 
reduced. Today, they have seemed to perfect the dual launch capability. Airanespace’s 
2009 annual report brings these remarkable achievements to the forefront by reporting 
seven Ariane 5 launches in 2009; and of the seven launches five were dual-launch 
configured. In other words, five launch vehicles placed 10 large communication satellites 
into geostationary orbit at almost half the launch expense per satellite. What would cost 
approximately $130–160 million U.S. dollars per satellite if launched individually is now 
a shared cost reducing the launch to $65–80 million U.S. dollars. This strategy has paid 
huge dividends for Arianespace, which reported that they have placed more than half of 
all commercial satellites now in orbit [13]. 
Arianespace’s efforts have made them the leader in commercial launch services, 
securing 11 of the 22 global satellite contracts for the 2009.  This is half of the world’s 
commercial launch service contacts and includes 9 of the 14 new satellites equating to 
65% of the total market [13]. Currently, Arianespace is the only commercial launch 
system capable of launching dual payloads. One would think that such a configuration 
would only allow small satellites; however, the reality is that each satellite approaches the 
10,000 lb mark and are delivered to a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). On 14 
November 2007, the Ariane 5 set a heavy lift record. It successfully launched two 
satellites, the Skynet 5B and the Star One C1, into a GTO. The two vehicles had a 
combined weight of 19,206 lbs, nearly the weight of a 38-foot school bus. The 
Arianespace 2007 Annual Report noted that it was responsible for 80% of the satellites 
placed in geostationary transfer orbit during 2007 making this a new record for the 
industry [14].  
Since gaining experience in the dual launch configuration, Arianespace is now 
embarking on offering three distinct configurations for multiple payloads. The SYLDA 5 
(SYstème de Lancement Double Ariane 5) is its workhorse and is capable of carrying the 




(Structure Porteuse Externe Lancement TRiple Ariane), which allows for lighter 
spacecraft or triple spacecraft configurations. The final system, which fulfills the smaller 
satellite requirements, is the ASAP 5 (Ariane Structure for Auxiliary Payload 5) adapter. 
This adapter is very similar in performance and design to the ESPA ring and is capable of 
carrying up to eight satellites considered to be mini and micro by definition. It can be 
mounted under the primary payload and carry up to eight 260 lb micro-satellites or can be 
mounted inside the Sylda structure and can carry up to four 660 lb mini-satellites.  
The numbers reported in Arianespace’s Annual Report show a company able to 
take a small market and generate profits with their high thrust large rocket. Its launch 
manifest is filled with customers and scientific missions ready for the future.  
3. EELV—Application and Intent 
The EELV concept has always followed the mindset that it is better to evolve a 
system versus drastically advancing a system. The success rate of evolved systems has 
continually demonstrated increased reliability when compared to launch vehicles that 
attempted to take drastic (repeated) steps or revolutionary redesigns. The typical first- 
and second-generation vehicles are plagued with launch failures and oversight defects. 
The best example of successful launch vehicle evolution in operational practice is the 
Soviet-built Soyuz rocket. This launch vehicle became operational in 1963 and has 
operated with a launch rate as high as 45 launches a year. By slowly evolving the system, 
The Russians have been able to create a highly successful launch vehicle with a 97% 
success rate, and is approaching 733 launches [15]. The Soyuz is also the preferred 
launch vehicle for Russia manned missions and has safely delivered astronauts and 
tourists to the International Space Station (ISS) [16]. In general, the evolved system is a 
safer way to ensure mission success and cost reduction. The EELV program is working 
diligently at making EELVs the future of reliable spacelift by mitigating risk and 
increasing standardization in design. 
The U.S.-developed EELV concept began in the late 1990s when the U.S. launch 




Force to give $500 million each to Lockheed Martin Co. and Boeing Corporation to 
evolve their current medium to heavy lift vehicles. The companies then added $500 
million of their own capital to create launch vehicles capable of fulfilling the 
requirements for future demands. This large investment paid off with the creation of 
Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V and Boeing’s Delta IV launch vehicles.  
When the EELV concept was created in the 1990s, it was built under the 
forecasted boon in the launch industry. With this growth never coming to fruition, the 
launch vehicles could not be supported under the actual launch manifests. Some drastic 
decisions needed to be made to ensure both the Atlas V and Delta IV would survive and 
maintain Assured Access to Space (AATS). AATS is the attempt to maintain two launch 
vehicles to limit the potential for a complete medium to heavy lift grounding if an issue 
occurs. If the United States must ground a fleet of vehicles from flying and there is only 
one fleet, then the United States loses space access and control. By maintaining two 
launch vehicles, the United States has a better chance at keeping one fleet of launch 
vehicles in operations while the issue is being resolved on the other.  
On 1 December 2006, a decision was made that would forever shape the launch 
vehicle industry. The decision was to create a distinct and sole launch company called the 
United Launch Alliance (ULA), which would be capable of maintaining two launch 
vehicles and consolidating costs to attempt to make the industry profitable. This was a 
process in which the Lockheed Martin Co. and Boeing Co. combined “the assets of the 
two programs, including mission management and support, engineering, vehicle 
production, test and launch operations, and, most importantly, the people whose 
intellectual capital will enable the new venture [17].”  
Now five years into the venture and a strict focus on mission assurance and 
launch vehicle development, what was once a sinking business is starting to show novel 
initiatives. The competitive mindset is becoming the answer to reducing launch vehicle 
costs and increasing success rates. Since their first operational use on 21 August 2002, 
the EELV vehicles maintain a record of 41 (25 Atlas V, 16 Delta IV) launches with a 




ever more robust and solid system. This continuous improvement is best noted at ULA’s 
website, which shows their complete dedication to Atlas and Delta mission success along 
with their upcoming project of commercial human spaceflight and multi payload 
accommodations.  
ULA is developing a new suite of options available for dual and multiple launch 
payloads. Their implementation of best practices is evident across the two systems with 
open communication, a sharing of ideas, and applying proven procedures across the 
board ensuring mission success is the #1 priority. Currently, the ESPA ring and other 
multiple payload options are being pursued in an attempt to satisfy customers and 
become more competitive in the global market. By examining and calculating the wasted 
margin in each mission, ULA can use the ESPA ring to deliver other assets to orbit, thus 
maximizing capabilities. Goodwin and Wegner [18] noted that U.S. government payloads 
are restricted to using U.S. launch vehicles. ESPA allows DoD small programs with 
typical small budgets the opportunity to launch on high-priced, high-reliable launch 
vehicles.  
Even though the development of the large dual payload capability for the United 
States is still a few years away, the ESPA ring is available now and was operationally 
verified under the Space Test Program-1 (STP-1) mission launched aboard an Atlas V on 
8 March 2007. This test program used the ESPA ring to launch four satellites into two 
different orbits verifying the capability exists to execute a multi-launch configuration 
successfully on any future mission with sufficient margin.  
C. SPACE ACQUISITION REFORM 
In 2001, a Space Commission was directed to assemble findings and 
recommendation for the approach in which the United States should handle space 
activities. The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization was created and headed by the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld. The 
commission noted, “the security and well being of the United States, its allies and friends 




the commission should focus. Of the areas, a few directly pertain to the launch vehicles, 
propagation of space assets, and technology development, which ESPA can support. The 
report said the United States needed to “develop revolutionary methods of collecting 
intelligence from space to provide the President the information necessary for him to 
direct the nation’s affairs, manage crises and resolve conflicts in a complex and changing 
international environment [19].” It also noted that a great need existed to “promote 
government and commercial investment in leading edge technologies to assure that the 
U.S. has the means to master operations in space and compete in international markets 
[19].”  This focus is designed to “encourage the U.S. commercial space industry to field 
systems one generation ahead of international competitors [19].”  By utilizing the excess 
margin on launch vehicle and creating a standard launch service, newly developed 
systems can perform in the operational environment much sooner by verifying the 
prototype designs. This acquisition approach is directly in line with the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations [20].  
The GAO, noted that space acquisition is a broken process in need of great 
changes to ensure successful management and mission execution to control program 
costs, schedules, and performances.  “While DoD actions to date have been good, more 
changes to processes, policies, and support may be needed—along with sustained 
leadership and attention—to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including 
addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs.” [21] In a speech given by Senator 
Wayne Allard on 23 September 2005, he stated, “I strongly believe the continued mis-
management of our space acquisition programs is a far greater threat to our space 
dominance than any external threat [22].”  He went on to say, “over the last decade, we 
have done everything possible to sabotage our space supremacy [22].” His speech 
brought home the importance of changing the way space acquisition programs are being 
implemented and managed.  




subsystems being used based upon their TRL. Senator Allard continues to note that research and development does not belong in an acquisition program because the program becomes dependant on the technology being developed instead of managing the schedule [22]. 
General agreement exists that three major issues result in program failure or 
extreme overruns [23]. First, programs begin with poor requirement definitions at the 
onset of program development leading to unrealistic and over optimistic proposals during 
source selection. Second, the attempted implementation of new technologies, which 
resides in the infancy state of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) spectrum mean the 
program is frequently delayed and will experience cost overruns. The third major cause 
of program meltdowns are the continued failure to use an evolutionary acquisition 
process properly coupled with spiral development, which is the standard for acquisition 
development but continues to be ignored in the desire for revolutionary approaches [23].  
Discussed in the introduction, the SBIRS, AEHF, and NPOESS programs are 
three highly visibility programs that received Nunn-McCurdy breaches due to their 
system costs reaching a threshold greater than 25% over the approved contract value. 
These three programs have all experienced increased cost growth and schedule delays, 
and decreased system capabilities. When initially bid, the contracts were awarded for 
approximately $3 billion for the SBIRS program, $2.3 billion for the AEHF program and 
$6.8 billion for the NPOESS program [23]. After extensive cuts and schedule delays, the 
systems are forecasted to cost in excess of: $13 billion for the SBIRS program, $6.3 
billion for the AEHF program, and $11.1 billion for the NPEOSS program, which was 
finally dissolved in February 2010. These examples are just a few that show how current 
programs continue to fall behind in cost, schedule, and performance. The lack of poor 
concept design, inaccurate proper TRL scoping, and improper evolutionary acquisition 
processes are causing these delays. Figure 5 shows a series of programs reviewed by the 
GAO showing SBIRS, AEHF, and NPOESS performance based on cost comparison and 
schedule growths. It is clear that a major and valid concern exists concerning the way in 






Figure 5.   GAO Program Cost Growth [From 23]  
The GAO report entitled Space Acquisitions—The DoD Faces Substantial 
Challenges in Developing New Space Systems reported four major areas that have caused 
substantial cost growth, schedule delays, and performance reductions when evaluating 
space programs. Two of the three areas directly relate to areas in which ESPA supported 
missions would assist with acquisition reform. The first area deals with program 
Authority To Proceed (ATP) beginning too early in the process. When most programs 
gain approved budgets, it is because the proposed technology is so advanced over the 
legacy systems that the benefits to national security or science missions seem to be worth 
the cost. The problems are that the proposed technology is not mature enough in its life 
cycle and it drives increased and schedule delays due to the program’s requirement to 
develop the technology further through the latter parts of the TRLs. The GAO explains 





receive funding because they are labeled as lab work or experiments. A program labeled 
as an acquisition program receives more dollars and approvals over a program labeled 
R&D.  
The second area in which ESPA can help improve acquisition reform is by 
breaking the customary approach of developing colossal systems capable of a multitude 
of missions and payloads over larger yet smaller constellations with less complexities. 
This approach is exacerbated due to the high cost of launch vehicles. If a mission is 
factoring in $100–$200M per launch vehicle, a more complex satellite is justified by 
recognizing the costs of reducing the number of required launches to populate a 
constellation.  
Today’s Congressional and DoD leadership are being very vocal about how the 
acquisition process is broken and that “requirements creep” will no longer be tolerated 
[24].  On 6 April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced key decisions 
for the 2010 defense budget. In his speech, he specifically discussed issues within the 
DoD procurement, acquisition, and contracting arenas. He noted that the defense 
acquisition process is going to be one of his three principal objectives of change. Effects 
are already being felt in the space acquisition process through his announcement that the 
Transformational Satellite Communication System (TSAT) program is being terminated. 
The termination of the $26 billion program follows with his clear recognition that 
“adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer platforms that take longer 
and longer to build must come to an end [24].”  This quote confirms the days of creating 
complex mega-systems, with overstated requirements and underestimated costs, will 
become the exception rather than the norm. The new focus will be on the incremental 
development of small less complex systems.  
Secretary Gates also continued to note that the new defense procurement process 
“requires an acquisition system that can perform with greater urgency and agility [24].” 
Creating systems with fewer “bells and whistles” and more responsiveness is beneficial 
to both program and national desires. By establishing a simplistic approach as the goal, 




flexibility and the ability to streamline our requirements and acquisition execution 
procedures [24].”  This approach will be a completely different direction than the current 
approach in which program after program continues to not learn from others mistakes. 
This new approach will “guard against so-called “requirements creep,” validate the 
maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates, and 
demand stricter contract terms and conditions [24].” 
D. ESPA CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
CSA Engineering developed the ESPA ring, under a Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program. Working with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and 
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Space Test Program (STP) detachment, it was 
able to communicate the requirements and operational inputs into an effective, simplistic, 
and affordable design. The structure allows one primary satellite and six secondary 
satellites to be launched on a single mission. The ESAP ring is a 1.5” thick cylinder made 
of 7075 aluminum with six main ports for secondary payload attachment. Additionally, 
access ports allow flexibility in gaining access to the inner chamber. Total dimensions of 
the ESPA are 24” tall and 62” in diameter. The impact to the spacecraft is 30 vertical 
inches due to the 24” high ESPA ring and the 6” high payload isolation system installed 
between the ESPA ring and the primary payload. This total height change is kept to a 
minimum, to reduce the overall impacts in loads analysis, acoustics, and hardware 
requirements typically requiring only longer connecting cables from the SV to LV 
through the ESPA ring. The thin aluminum design creates a stiff structure reducing the 
load factors to insure acoustic vibrations do not magnify through the structure. Strength 
was one main factor in designing the system. The single billet aluminum is machined to 
avoid the weakness associated with forging and increasing the overall stiffness enabling 
ESPA to carry a 15,000 lb primary payload and six 400 lb secondary payloads. The low 
stack height and stiff structure confirms the commitment to keeping the principal focus as 
being primary mission transparent.  
ESPA can carry up to six APL with a total weight of 400 lbs and the design 




Goodwin and Wenger [18], the “most challenging part of the development of the ESPA 
ring has been to design a truly generic structure that will accommodate the desires of 
future spacecraft designers.” This means a system must be created for satellites, which 
have not yet been designed or even conceived. Currently, the ESPA missions are 
designed to use the residual margin of capability from the launch vehicle remaining after 
calculating the requirements for the primary payload. This margin exists in all launches 
and can be the equivalent wasted margin of a medium class satellite. In [25] some cases, 
the margin (unused payload capability) can be as much as 3,628 kg (8,000 lb). Figure 6 is 
a notional bar chart forecasting future EELV missions and the predicted excess margin 
each mission will contain [26].  
 
 
Figure 6.   EELV Forecasted Launch Margin 
A typical launch vehicle-satellite vehicle (LV-SV) integration process includes 
for some excess capacity that may remain unused during launch, which is called Margin. 
Many times this excess capacity is highly conservative and can be viewed as wasted 
capacity. The average medium-heavy launch vehicle’s unused capacity ranges from 1,000 





is designed to make use of this margin and create a system upon which smaller satellites 
can piggyback at a greatly reduced cost. The ESPA ring’s benefits are lengthy and have 
been proven to offer great incentives to research and development, scientific missions, 
and unique developmental concepts. The benefits are discussed in further detail in the 
paper, but the main focus involves explaining the apprehensions and integration 
challenges and offer solutions that will reduce these apprehensions.  
The challenge for the ESPA ring is not in noting the available margin or even 
finding programs with a desire to operate on an ESPA ring, but instead the challenges rest 
with the integration complexities and “buy in” of the program managers on the primary 
missions. Adding complexity to a system, which is being monitored for its cost, schedule, 
and performance, drives program managers to a state of avoiding any new systems, 
which present increased complexity and potential delays. Working with the program 
manager and getting them involved in the steps will assist with the inherent desire to 
avoid additional activities. SV-LV integration is a complex process and involves many 
organizations with each party being concerned about its piece of the whole and its desire 
to ensure no additional risks are added to the mission. This idea of “keeping it simple” is 
desired since a basic principle of system engineering is to reduce the number of single 
point failures. By adding an ESPA ring and six other vehicles to the mission, the 
integration challenges will become more complicated and greater risks could be 
introduced. This thesis and chapter outlines ways in which Aerospace and the Space Test 
Program (STP) are regulating processes to reduce risk and increase standardization 
ensuring transparency in mission execution to the primary payload.  
Another hurdle involves the program managers in charge of the missions. 
Program managers, by design, wish to reduce activities not absolutely required for 
mission execution. If an ESPA ring is used, then program managers must worry about 
changes in the acoustical environment, additional hardware, and a larger workforce. By 
standardizing processes and funding the additional testing involved, the impacts can be 
reduced, and thus, allow the program managers to have a better understanding of exactly 




E. ESPA’S ABILITY FOR FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE 
1. Operationally Responsive Space 
Space operations typically rest in six primary mission areas, which drive the DoD 
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to pursue advancements in 
space capabilities. The mission areas are ISR, missile warning, environmental 
monitoring, communications, navigation, and exploration. These mission areas continue 
to be further honed bringing greater benefit to mankind. In an attempt to reduce cost and 
bring rapid responsive space capabilities to clearer focus, there is a push to develop a 
responsive space attitude. ORS is still in the early phases of development, understanding, 
and proper defining. This paragraph explains the route being pursued by the ORS office.  
ORS will provide an affordable capability to promptly, accurately, and 
decisively position and operate national and military assets in and through 
space and near space. The ORS vision is to provide rapid, tailorable space 
power focused at the operational and tactical level of war.” Space 
Command views ORS as an enabler with four components: Responsive 
Satellites, Responsive Spacelift, Responsive Launch Ranges, Near Space 
systems. [27] 
When read, the ORS vision seems to embrace a concept, such as the ESPA ring. 
ESPA can help exploit ORS by reducing costs and providing timely launch on demand 
capability. Having a more responsive and economical Science and Technology (S&T) 
program will allow the United States to remain ahead of rapidly evolving adversary space 
capabilities. This alleviates budget crunches by dividing the launch costs among multiple 
programs.  
The GAO space acquisition [28] reported that the ORS “initiative encompasses 
several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical capabilities, as well 
as identifying and implementing long-term technology and design solutions to reduce the 
cost and time of developing and delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS 
provides DoD with an opportunity to work outside the typical acquisition channels to 
more quickly and less expensively deliver these capabilities.” ORS has a series of 




preparing and executing rapid responsive capabilities [29]. The first is the need to 
develop end-to-end ORS enablers required to meet the nation’s strategic need for highly 
responsive space capabilities. This includes satellite telemetry, tracking, command and 
control, satellite payload tasking and sensor data processing, exploitation and 
dissemination, responsive space CONOPS, and authorities necessary for achieving ORS 
objectives. The second is to execute rapid end-to-end capability efforts to meet urgent 
operational needs of joint force commanders. To empower the joint force commanders, 
systems will need to augment, reconstitute or implement new capability and complement 
the current fielded space capabilities.  
2. Technology Readiness Level—Validation Through Fly-Offs 
In a typical acquisition process for terrestrial-based products, a “fly-off” 
competition is exercised when developmental programs seem too complex or difficult to 
validate on paper alone. The idea is to have two or more competing contractors build 
working prototypes. These models are then tested and reviewed for feasibility, 
performance, and requirements adherence. What is accomplished is a validation of the 
technological readiness of the system. Developed by NASA in the 1980s, the TRL of a 
system is the “systematic metric/measurement system that supports assessments of the 
maturity of a particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity between 
different types of technology [30].” By labeling the maturity of a particular technology, a 
better understanding of the effort required to bring the system into operational use is 
detailed. If a technology is too immature and still based on theories or only in a lab 
environment, it will have too many unknowns. If a technology is mature and has been 
validated in the operational environment for which it is intended, then that system proves 
its viability and utility in operations. As noted in the Acquisition Manager’s Guidebook, 
“a key enabler for evolutionary acquisition and reduced cycle time is to have technology 
that is sufficiently mature to be fielded in a relatively short time. This requires having a 
method for measuring maturity, and a process for ensuring that technologies are 





However, in the space segment, most contracts are won with no physical proof 
that the capability is mature enough for development. The main reason is due to the 
difficulties in achieving orbit, the expensive cost of satellite development, and the limited 
number of satellites produced for each constellation.  Most systems only produce three to 
six satellites and a fly-off would be excessively expensive. By having contracts awarded 
based on designs and proposals, many systems are still very immature.  This unknown in 
performance has led many programs down the spiraling abyss of being over budget and 
brandished with the Nunn-McCurdy Breach stigma.  
The ESPA ring can make fly-offs possible by testing proposed payloads. In many 
situations, technology risks to TRLs only rest in a few components on the satellite. 
Typically, the bus’s thrusters, heating systems, and attitude controls are already widely 
used in satellites. The real risk is with a few of the payload’s sensor components or data 
links. These areas can be tested in the operational environment through small payloads 
aboard an ESPA mission. By making more unknowns known, the government would 
have better control in the acquisition process and could award contracts with less risk.  
The key to transitioning technology—whether developed by industry or 
government—is the availability of sufficient funds to mature technology 
through later TRLs. Great ideas in the laboratory many times do not 
translate easily into workable DoD systems. Funds to mature and test these 
ideas are needed; however, the budget cycle for most programs requires as 
much as two years of planning before funds are available. Therefore, the 
technology provider and the PM must agree early and plan to prevent 
funding lapses during development. [31] 
Figure 7 is from the Manager’s Guide to Technology Transition in an 
Evolutionary Acquisition Environment [31]. The figure defines each of the nine TRLs. 
What is important to observe is that a TRL jump from six to seven is the transition from 
science and technology typically performed in a lab environment to an operational 
environment test.  If the technology is demonstrated in an operational test, it is considered 







Figure 7.   TRL Description (From: AMGB, 2003 [From 31]) 
After a technology leaves the scientific area, it is typically developed to deliver 
some type of capability for a higher level system.   An example of this type of capability 
is a new camera system for a micro-satellite.   If a capability is crucial for an upcoming 
satellite system, the government program manager will likely assign a performance 
metric to track.  This type of performance metric is called a Key Performance Parameter 
(KPP).    KPP are the required capabilities that a system must operate within and deliver 
for the program.   Being able to test this capability and measure the performance (the 
KPP) in a real operational environment would be of significant benefit to both the 
government and the capability developer.   This testing allows the government and 
contractor to have a common goal to achieve for mission performance.  By taking the 
new technology and testing it in the operational environment, the feasibility and concept 
is proven, which greatly reduces the unknowns in development. Learning from mistakes, 
it is possible to start to see greater accountability in verifying higher TRL’s in each 




2008 Budget Request and Status of Space Activities, it was noted that “historically, programs perform better when they have clear, stable requirements, technology at the appropriate level of maturity, and high-confidence cost estimates early in the acquisition process [32].” 
3. Adherence to GAO Recommendations and Acquisition Reform 
The GAO is known as “the investigative arm of Congress” and “the congressional 
watchdog.” “GAO supports Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and 
helps improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
benefit of the American people” [33]. The GAO is responsible for evaluating programs 
and grading them on their performance in regards to cost, schedule, and budget 
management. Due to the recent abundance of Nunn-McCurdy breaches, the GAO’s role 
is becoming more prominent.  
Following GAO’s review of the space acquisition process and following programs 
with success and failures, a list of steps has been compiled to help with the selection of 
new contracts, and once a contract has been awarded, the monitoring of the contract. 
Figure 8 outlines the steps needed for successful execution of space acquisition programs 
[34]. The ESPA system assists in fulfilling these by bridging the gap between the 
laboratory and the environmental operation and test. The bolded bullets show where the 
ESPA system can offer a direct benefit to programs. As the GAO recommends, a 
program should not begin until the TRL of a system moves from Level 6 to Level 7. This 
transfer allows for the prototypes to be tested in the operational environment. What 
happens when a program is initiated when the technology is already at a Level 7? There 
are two polar opposite and conflicting answers. First, the program has a much higher 
chance of being on time, on budget, and offers substantial leaps in improvement over the 
predecessor system. Second, the program is frequently viewed as simple and obsolete in 
the aerospace industry since few leaps and challenges need to be resolved during the 






not bring about the award winning challenges sought after through revolutionary 
approaches, but it is beginning to be viewed as the recommended way to initiate a 
program.  
 
Before undertaking new programs 
• Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and it is clear where projects stand in relation 
to the overall portfolio. 
• Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather than attempting to 
satisfy all needs in a single step. 
• Match requirements to resources—that is, time, money, technology, and people—before undertaking a 
new development effort. 
• Research and define requirements before programs are started and limit changes 
after they are started. 
• Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated regularly.  
• Commit to fully fund projects before they begin. 
• Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended before programs are 
started. 
• Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research departments until 
they are ready to be added to future generations (increments) of a product. 
• Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and requirements before 
launching the development process. 
During program development 
• Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go decisions, 
covering critical facets of the program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, 
design readiness, production readiness, and relationships with suppliers. 
• Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are met—for example, a high proportion of 
engineering drawings completed or production processes under statistical control. 
• Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the program and to resolve problems 
and implement solutions. 
• Hold program managers accountable for their choices. 
• Require program managers to stay with a project to its end. 
• Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their products through such activities as 
regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and delivery, among other things. 
• Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage collaboration and communication. 
Figure 8.   Successful Execution of Space Acquisition Programs [From 34] 
The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is a perfect example of a program with a 
mature TRL at inception. In the beginning, the WGS system was called the Wideband 




foreseen gap left from Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) satellites. The 
gapfiller connotation has been used on many programs to show that the system is not 
intended to be the follow-on or replacement system, but just a simple system to augment 
the current constellation, which has been forecasted to operate below mission 
requirements due to either a loss of a satellite or degradation of capabilities. Once the 
DSCS follow-on (Advanced Wideband System) was determined to be too complex with a 
price tag too expensive for Congress, “Gapfiller” in WGS was replaced with something 
more enduring like “Global.” Now the constellation is known as Wideband Global 
SATCOM (WGS) and the performance is nothing shy of revolutionary when compared to 
the DSCS system. Each satellite can support data transmission rates ranging from 2.1 
Gbps to more than 3.6 Gbps. By comparison, a DSCS III satellite will support up to 0.25 
Gbps [35]. Due to the termination of the Advanced Wideband System, the DoD has now 
ordered six total WGS systems and predicts a long future for the constellation. 
The greatest lesson learned from the WGS program is that a system built from 
evolutionary processes, as opposed to revolutionary, will typically come very close to 
their milestones in cost, schedule, and performance. The WGS system was one success 
story that arrived at the right time and within budget but brought with it 10 times greater 
capability than the previous DSCS system. Currently, the WGS system is one of the few 
space programs to wear a badge of honor in the acquisition realm.  
F. SUMMARY 
The complexity in forecasting and developing new systems to meet the demands 
of the warfighter continues to become more difficult and creates programs with 
significant uncertainties. As noted in this chapter, many space programs have doubled 
their budget, doubled their time, reduced their quantity and reduced their systems 
requirements. This moving target approach needs something to give the acquisition 
manager better influence in determining the true cost, schedule, and capabilities being 
requested. The ESPA ring provides prototypes as a means to advance TRL from the 




III. ESPA’S MISSIONS AND ROLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With a goal of reducing the number of single point failures on launch vehicles, the 
aerospace industry is apprehensive about changing current processes and pursuing new 
endeavors. This mindset drives building redundancy in the system and removes anything 
not absolutely required. First, this approach is great for mission risk reduction, but at a 
severe cost to scientific research and potentially significant unused margin. Second is the 
missed opportunity for the industry leaders to pass their experience and knowledge on to 
auxiliary payload’s developmental teams, specifically experience with reducing risks and 
properly applying technological advances under the most controlled processes.  The APL 
providers must leverage the experience of the government, industry and aerospace 
personnel to ensure their program begins with a solid base of requirements.  
Many potential auxiliary payloads’ program managers might be under the 
impression that they fully understand the launch process, but truly, they are unaware of 
the extreme complexities required to enable launch success.  The 14th AF has taken the 
first step by developing the processes and milestones used to determine EELV assigned 
launch dates. This board, known as the Current Launch Schedule Review Board 
(CLSRB) assigns “slots” to all contracted EELV missions allowing adequate time to plan 
for specific launch dates at the earliest opportunity. Studying the successful STP-1 
mission, LCROSS mission, and the future DSX mission, program managers will gain a 
thorough understanding of the difficulties involved in designing, integrating, and 
executing a multi payload mission.  
B. EELV SECONDARY PAYLOAD ADAPTER (ESPA) MISSIONS 
1. Space Test Program-1  
On 8 March 2007, the first ESPA-ring on an Atlas V was successfully launched 
from Cape Canaveral Air Station. STP and the Defense Advanced Research Projects 




experiments the opportunity to perform their operational missions. The mission was 
named the Space Test Program-1 (STP-1) and launched aboard an Atlas V EELV. The 
Centaur upper stage performed multiple orbital maneuvers to deliver the payloads into 
two different orbits. With the upper stage and ESPA ring (Figure 9) performing 
flawlessly, each payload was able to bring valuable research and on orbit data to future 
programs. This single launch was responsible for validating many scientific experiments, 
which typically require years of waiting for individual rides. The missions are explained 
in detail solidifying the unique benefits ESPA rings can offer typical low cost 






Figure 9.   STP-1 Figure 10.   STP-1 SV Integration 
a. STP-1 Primary Mission 
Orbital Express is a DARPA-funded project, which “will validate the 
technical feasibility of robotic, autonomous on-orbit refueling and reconfiguration of 
satellites during a three-month mission” [36]. This program deployed two satellites, Next 
Generation Serviceable Satellite (NextSat), and the Autonomous Space Transport 




proving the feasibility to repair or upgrade existing satellites. A lesson learned from the 
NextSat and ASTRO docking mission was the need for common connecting joints.  
Much like the common Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection on today’s computers, 
handhelds, and MP3 players; a common docking connection is needed for spacecrafts to 
perform on-orbit refueling and parts replacements.  In a space reform discussion, Lee 
[37] recommends using standardized common components approach and plug-and-play 
architecture. This modular structure allows for the creation of satellites similar to the 
highly successful structure of personal computers. Making a bus and payload system 
capable of upgrades, a program can continue to evolve with technology readiness levels. 
The ability of the long acquisition cycle (sometimes 10 years prior to the first SV launch) 
to upgrade subsystems will help the program stay ahead of the technology curve and 
reduce the possibility that the satellite is outdated before it even launches. The data 
Orbital Express will provide for validation of on orbit fueling and repair will allow this 
plug-and-play approach to be feasible for future systems and make upgrades possible 
during a program’s acquisition life cycle.  
b. STP-1 Auxiliary Missions 
STPSat-1 is a Space Test Program satellite designed with two primary 
missions and one secondary mission. Together, the data received is answering scientific 
questions about the Earth’s atmosphere and proves Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems 
(MEMS) technology. The Spatial Heterodyne Imager for Mesospheric Radicals 
(SHIMMER) is a high resolution ultraviolet spectrometer, which is the first satellite to 
use the spatial heterodyne spectroscopy (SHS) technique that “significantly reduces the 
instrument’s size and weight while retaining the spectral resolution and exceeding the 
sensitivity of comparable conventional instrumentation [38].”  The second payload is the 
Scintillation and Tomography Receiver in Space (CITRIS). This experiment is presenting 
a global map of ionospheric densities and irregularities. MEMS PicoSat Inspector 
(MEPSI) deployed from STPSat1 and performed maneuvers and proximity operations. 
“It is the first microsatellite built to specifically exploit the new ESPA multi-mission 




CFESat, or Cibola Flight Experiment Satellite, was developed by Los 
Alamos National Laboratory and is designed to detect and survey VHF and UHF signals. 
This mission is assisting with reducing and correcting single event upsets that may cause 
most computer systems to malfunction. CFESat will also prove space capable field-
programmable gate arrays, which until now, have only been used terrestrially [40].  
FalconSat-3 gave Air Force Academy students’ hands on experience into 
designing, developing, and deploying an operational satellite. This three-axis stabilized 
system carried five payloads and “requires ± one degree attitude determination within 
two standard deviations and ± five degree attitude control within one standard deviation 
of ram direction [41].” These tight tolerances make this micro satellite a highly capable 
research vessel and can bring valuable data for future missions.  
MidSTAR-1 was built by the U.S. Naval Academy to test the application 
of a sensor that can detect more than 15 different chemicals for safety and identification 
from something as small as a postage stamp. The satellite is also equipped with a variable 
emissivity film. “Used on a spacecraft, the film can reduce launch weight, make future 
thermal design easier, reduce power consumption, and allow more accurate control of the 
spacecraft’s inside temperature [42].  
c. STP-1 Firsts 
The STP-1 mission challenged the aerospace industry towards innovative 
thinking. This challenge came through performing many unique integration challenges 
and upper stage maneuvers. The first involved making this the inaugural launch of an Air 
Force mission aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle. Not only was this the first Air Force 
EELV mission, but it was also the first time an ESPA Ring was used on any mission. The 
Centaur upper stage was also put to test by deploying seven unique spacecrafts (nine total 
experiments) into dual-orbits with different inclinations. This required the Centaur upper 
stage to perform three main engine ignitions, which was the first time this was done on an 




2. NASA’s Lunar CRater and Observation and Sensing Satellite 
(LCROSS) and Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Mission 
Pursuing the vision of placing a man on Mars, NASA is returning to the moon as 
a layover station. To find a suitable landing site and search for sufficient quantities of 
hydrogen for human survival in the form of water and for producing rocket fuel on the 
moon, the LRO and LCROSS missions were designed to work together in a joint effort to 
map and detect soil content on the moon.  LRO is the primary mission with the LCROSS 
mission being made possible by imaginative thinking and utilizing unused launch vehicle 
margin. This unused margin provided scientists with the opportunity to develop another 
mission and achieve greater benefits from a single launch. After screening a series of 
potential missions, the LCROSS mission was chosen. This mission deployed the LRO 
satellite and then prepared itself to send the Atlas V Centaur upper stage on a path to 
impact the moon. The kinetic energy caused a crater approximately 20–30 meters in 
diameter with a spectroscopic data reporting approximately 25 gallons of water released 
from the surface of the moon [43].  
Capitalizing from the use of a single Atlas V EELV, NASA used an ESPA ring to 
create a complex multi-exploration mission. The ESPA ring acted as the adapter for the 
LRO vehicle and was the primary structure for the LCROSS spacecraft. Using the ESPA 
ring, the LCROSS structure allowed each attachment location to become a specific 
subsystem and reduced the technical complexity.  
Since the LRO mission was paying for the booster, the LCROSS mission received 
a ride for almost free by using the space margin available, which allowed LCROSS to be 
“built, integrated, and tested by Northrop Grumman in just 26 months for the NASA 
Ames Research Center on a $56 million contract [44].  
On 18 June 2009, the LCROSS and LRO missions were launched from Cape 
Canaveral, FL. After LCROSS separated from the LRO spacecraft, it continued to be 
connected to the Centaur upper stage. The orbital path took the vehicle from a lunar pass, 





the vehicle traveled nearly 5.6 million miles. Once it was time for mission execution, the 
LCROSS vehicle released the Centaur upper stage (Figure 11), and it impacted the moon 
on 9 October 2009 (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 11.   LCROSS Centaur Separation 
 
 
Figure 12.   LCROSS Image of Moon Impact 
LCROSS took data readings and observations of the impact in multiple 




itself on a path to impact the moon, gaining even more useful data. LRO continues to 
orbit the moon collecting data. “We are ecstatic,” said Anthony Colaprete, LCROSS 
project scientist and principal investigator at NASA’s Ames Research Center in Moffett 
Field, CA. “Multiple lines of evidence show water was present in both the high angle 
vapor plume and the eject curtain created by the LCROSS Centaur impact. The 
concentration and distribution of water and other substances requires further analysis, but 
it is safe to say Cabeus holds water” [45]. 
The success of the STP-1 and LCROSS missions is gaining support throughout 
the Aerospace community and encouraging more programs to continue researching 
innovative ways an ESPA ring can benefit future projects.  An example of the support 
and innovation is the Demonstration and Science Experiments (DSX) which is detailed in the following section.   
3. Upcoming ESPA Mission 
a. DSX The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is developing the DSX satellite to fly secondary aboard an ESPA ring equipped DMSP Flight-19 mission. The mission is scheduled for an October 2012 launch on an Atlas V launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). This is another great opportunity for the 
Space Development and Test Directorate (SDTD) office to prove the ESPA ring’s benefits in an operational environment. The DMSP launch presents an ideal orbit for the mission requirements of DSX and plenty of residual margins exists to carry the 
DSX SV along for the ride. The DSX payload consists of 13 individual payloads, which 
are combined together to focus on three major areas of space physics and the space 
environment through tests of the Wave Particle Interaction Experiment, Space Weather 
Experiment, and Space Environmental Effects. Figure 13 shows the DSX satellite 






Figure 13.   DSX During Testing at AFRL Space Vehicles Directorate  
b. Primary Objectives of DSX  
The primary objectives of DSX as reported by Scherbarth [46] are listed 
below: 
• The DSX system shall resolve critical feasibility issues for VLF Wave-
Particle Interactions to include determination of VLF antenna injection 
efficiency from ground and space-based transmitters, characterization of 
the global distribution of natural and man-made VLF waves in the inner 
magnetosphere, and the detection of perturbations of particle populations 
due to injected VLF. 
• DSX shall measure and map the distributions of energetic protons, 
electrons, and low energy plasma in the inner magnetosphere to improve 
models for spacecraft design and operations. 
• DSX shall operate a minimum of one year in the space environment. 
• DSX will conduct an Adaptive Controls Experiment (ACE) to validate 
critical attitude control technologies that target flexible structural modes, 





Another area in which the ESPA ring could offer benefits to the DMSP 
program would be as a relay for DMSP satellites with failed tape recorders. “These 
spacecraft are still taking valuable data in real-time and are able to downlink the data for 
field terminal users. However, there is no way for the satellites to relay their data when 
they are out of site of a ground terminal [47].” This would be a perfect opportunity for 
ESPA to carry small relay satellites to fly within the orbital parameters of DMSP 
satellites recording and relaying the data upon command.  
4. ESPA Missions Summary 
It is remarkable to see these two unique missions, STP-1 and LCROSS, offer 
many benefits to scientific and operational activities. These missions brought about great 
progress in advancing scientific knowledge and TRL. Together, these two missions 
brought about 17 scientific experiments to advance knowledge and understanding of 
future mission designs. Other areas noted by Chavez, Barrera, and Kanter [47] ESPA 
systems could analyze GPS environments and add improvements to follow-on systems. 
Future programs can use the ESPA ring as a complete constellation dissemination system 
delivering up to 18–24 satellites through one launch, which would be accomplished by 
stacking 3–4 ESPA rings within one payload fairing and maintaining the designed six-
satellite configuration per ESPA ring. Large constellations, similar to the 66-satellite 
Iridium constellation, could be populated with three or four EELV launches. The future 
holds extensive options for mission integration and advancements of the state of U.S. 
technology.  
C. MISSION INTEGRATION  
By adhering to the rules laid forth in the ESPA RUG, the auxiliary satellite 
developers will be able to focus on implementing the proven requirements to achieve the 
desired mission success. Conforming to these rules is vital to ensure the ESPA initiative 
survives. The only way to get and keep the ESPA ring in operational status is through 
proven performance and minimizing interference with the primary mission. The 




trying to keep the instrument ensemble on tempo. This manager needs to have a clear 
understanding of what all parties offer and their desires for success. By working to bring 
all parties together in a formal controlled fashion the program manager can achieve 
mission success. There are four critical activities that have to be accomplished by the 
program manager.  The four activities are: taking appropriate risks, promoting the use of 
ESPA Policy, establishing quality standards, and controlling the integration process.   
1. Fear of Risk Can Mean Lost Opportunities 
Apprehension for the ESPA ring is driven by the industries risk reduction mindset 
and resistance to change. Program managers are focused on the primary payload and do 
not want to add additional complexities to their mission. The ESPA ring adds a new layer 
of integration to the launch but brings benefits, which are explained in the next chapter. 
Higher level leaders in the acquisition chain of command, who know the benefits that 
ESPA ring offers, must promote the program.   Also, a system must be in place to ensure 
secondary payloads adhere to all standards through a consistent format detailing all 
requirements.  
2. ESPA Policy 
Forceful leadership support occurred on 13 February 2008 when the Secretary of 
the Air Force signed a memorandum on the subject of EELV Secondary Payload Adapter 
(ESPA) Policy. This memorandum was the essential step needed for the progress of the 
ESPA ring’s utilization in missions with sufficient margin. Three major points can be 
gleaned from the memorandum. The first is the realization that EELV missions do have 
sufficient excess weight margins and this excess weight should be used to maximize the 
ESPA. “As such, it is my policy to make ESPA-hosted satellite launches a routine 
operation starting NLT FY12 [48].” Second, the development of an ESPA utilization plan 
and implementation guidance is required by the FY10 POM (Program Objective 
Memorandum). “AFSPC should also continue near-term efforts to make the ESPA 
available as a low-cost, highly reliable, standardized service for small payloads when 




an affordable system for scientific, research, development and ORS systems, and 
provides a lower cost method to place their payloads in orbit. With the additional 
leadership scrutiny, the APL provider must present a quality product with valuable 
research and a solid mission design. “This policy is an important milestone in our efforts 
to provide routine and affordable access to space for scientific, research, development, 
and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) missions [48].” 
3. Quality Is Mandatory 
The APL provider must follow strict adherence and unique requirements.  In other 
words, the success of the ESPA depends on the earnest efforts of the secondary payload 
provider.  The secondary payload provide must ensure the development of quality 
spacecrafts that follow the exacting guidance found in the ESPA RUG, which will 
promote mission success for all parties. This approach is not a novel idea but one in 
which new entrants, or small developers, need to learn from the leaders in the industry. 
Government program offices need to provide the leadership and financial planning to 
ensure the authority to perform APL implementation is exercised. APL providers must 
minimize risk for the primary payload by following a documented approval process 
contained in two key documents. The first document, which gives build requirements for 
APLs, is the ESPA RUG. The second is the Standard APL-ESPA-LV ICD (Interface 
Control Document) that takes the current Satellite Vehicle (SV) to LV ICD and adds in 
the APL/ESPA requirements for the satellites and launch vehicle. SMC and STP are 
creating these documents to help standardize the integration efforts and reduce system 
risks.  
4. Vehicle Integration 
With AFSPC taking the lead on the ESPA program and following the direction to 
offer a low cost ride using excess margin, the majority of the required costs are covered 
by the primary payload and the support costs by SMC’s Launch and Range Systems 
Directorate (LRSD). This leaves the integration costs as the only real expense for the 




generous approach is restated by noting that integration and processing are the only costs 
incurred by the secondary payload provider, and not launch vehicle hardware and 
operations. This greatly reduces the cost because it eliminates the need to procure 
individual launch vehicles for each secondary payload.    
Utilizing large vehicles to carry additional small payloads is an excellent way to 
use the excess margin wasted on a majority of the launches. If the ESPA system is 
embraced, it will allow mission schedulers to view launch manifests years into the future 
and schedule slots for secondary payload configured missions. With this known launch 
tempo, secondary payloads can begin building their satellites to the ESPA specifications 
early in the development process and decrease the combined (primary and secondary) 
mission integration time drastically.   This method would also create a pool of “ESPA 
ready” satellites ready for launch. By having a pool of missions to choose from, the 
integration can begin at L-24 months and progress towards L-12, when the potential 
secondary payloads are screened based on integration readiness. This early preparation 
and integration activity will create a more responsive system achieving a timely, near 
ORS behavior.  
D. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The launch of an ESPA mission consists of four main participants, who 
collectively require effective communication and candid observations to ensure 
compliance and mission success. The four main players are the STP, APL, LRSD, and 
ULA. Encircling those players stands an outside observer known as the Independent 
Readiness Review Team (IRRT), which is responsible for providing an independent 






1. DoD Space Test Program (STP) 
STP is a subordinate under the Space Development and Test Directorate (SDTD) 
based at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.  STP “develops, tests and evaluates Air Force space 
systems, executes advanced space development and demonstration projects, and rapidly 
transitions capabilities to the warfighter [49].” The STP office is responsible for the 
receiving and coordination of APL requests. When a program needs further clarification 
about launching aboard an ESPA designed EELV, it coordinates requests for information 
through the STP office. Once a program desires to pursue a flight request, the STP office 
verifies its mission’s needs with upcoming ESPA mission configured flights. Next, 
potential candidates are released to the program to determine which mission works best. 
Once STP notifies the APL of which mission it is assigned, the APL receives the ESPA 
directives and mission kit, which must be followed to ensure compliance with established 
procedures. STP also coordinates the mission with the other parties to ensure agreement 
and inform of future activities. 
2. Auxiliary Payload (APL) Provider  
The APL provider is responsible for preparing and providing all required 
documents and testing to ensure a safe flight and noninterference with the primary 
payload. The work involved in designing the spacecraft must be built around the 
requirements set forth in the ESPA RUG, which must follow the APL manifest and 
mission assurance and risk reduction/mitigation plan. The APL must provide a mass 
simulator at the start of the mission. This simulator is required to ensure a backup plan 
exists to fill the void if the secondary payload cannot make flight.  
3. Launch and Range Systems Directorate (LRSD) 
LRSD at Los Angeles Air Force Base is responsible for monitoring and 
maintaining a full understanding of all upcoming launches. It maintains the database, 
which contains specifications on future launches and available margin. STP uses this 




LRSD is the primary point of contact for funding and contract issues. If an APL indicates 
a mission has unique requirements, the LRSD ensures compatibility with the launch 
vehicles. LRSD also handles the launch vehicle contract and booster and ground support 
equipment expenses of the APL.  
4. United Launch Alliance (ULA) 
United Launch Alliance focuses on the direct connection and adapters for the 
ESPA and Primary payload. They acquire the hardware and kits required for ESPA 
missions. It is also responsible for the entire integration process. As previously 
mentioned, ULA is working new initiatives to offer more payload configurations, 
allowing multiple variations of weight and sizes of satellites to fly aboard the Atlas V and 
Delta IV launch vehicles.  
5. Independent Readiness Review Team (IRRT) 
“The purpose of the Independent Readiness Review Team (IRRT) is to minimize 
the risk involved in a forthcoming launch by having an independent group of experts 
assess the readiness for launch of the flight hardware and the appropriate supporting 
elements [50].” 
Figure 14 shows how the primary payload and the APL teams work with the 
ESPA mission planners. The figure gives a breakdown of their primary responsibilities 






• Receive Flight Request
• Find Mission
• Coordinate Mission w/ LRSD & PPL
• Lead APL w/ Documentation
• Staff Package to SMC and AFSPC
• Maintain Launch Database
• Support SDTD w/ Tech Data
• Execute Contract Actions
• Support Tech Studies
• Acquire Mission Unique Hardware
• Responsible For LV & Payloads
• Provide PPL Data
• Verify APL Mass
• Verify Mission Safety
• Independent 
Assessment of    
Mission Data/ 
Studies/Hardware
• Procure ESPA Hardware
• Mission Integration
• APL Processing
• Prepare APL Manifest
• Prepare MA & Risk Plan
• Comply w/ Tech & PM
• Provide Mass Simulator
• Flight Readiness Cert
 
Figure 14.   Snapshot of the Organizations Involved and their Requirements 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter reviewed the STP-1 mission, the LCROSS mission and the future 
DSX mission. Each of the mission’s challenges, integration issues, and benefits brought 
about by introducing an ESPA system into a launch were discussed.  It concluded with a 
detailed description of the players with ESPA and described the documents for APL 
adherence. This chapter provided an overview of the different parts of the system that 
facilitate ESPA missions. With the leadership guidance, specification documents and the 
mission and roles identified, creation of a standardized service is possible, ensuring 
available rides for satellites built within required specifications. With this gained 
appreciation for the ESPA system, the Cal Poly CubeSat program will be discussed in the 








IV. STANDARDIZING FOR SUCCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Capitalizing on experiences from others is a standard engineering practice due to 
the rapid ability to implement the countless hours of knowledge and lessons learned from 
previous endeavors. Learning from experts and programs, which have great 
commonality, allows secondary payload developers to achieve milestones with more 
efficiency and ease. The California Polytechnic University and Stanford University 
developed the CubeSat program as a low-cost research capability for space access. Their 
concept is simple and has been embraced globally by universities and commercial and 
government organizations. The process revolves around the idea of multi-satellite 
development, standardization, and deployment activities, which resemble the ESPA 
standardization concept.  Their simple, low-cost, no-frills approach has created a wave of 
very successful programs, which fit in a 10 cm cubed spacecraft form factor with a mass 
up to 1.33 kg.  CubeSats have been successful due to the detailed specifications, which 
when followed from the onset of a program, make the integration and deployment very 
streamlined. Toorian, Blundell, Puig-Suari, and Twiggs [51] described three major 
CubeSat design specifications, which keep the CubeSats standardized through general 
specifications, P-Pod driven specifications, and safety specifications.  
B. CUBESAT AND P-POD DEPLOYMENT  
California Polytechnic University and Stanford University began the CubeSat 
program in 1999. Since the first multiple launch CubeSat mission in 2003, over 80 
universities, private companies, and government offices now develop CubeSat qualified 
systems.  Basic requirements and a simple design allowed universities and research 
departments the ability to develop low-cost experimental satellites for orbital missions. 
CubeSats are built for insertion into the Pico-satellite Orbital Deployer (P-Pod) that uses 
a spring ejection system and is the standard interface to the launch vehicles. Together, 






Figure 15.   CUBESAT Frame  
Just as the ESPA dictates standardization and noninterference requirements for 
the primary payload, CubeSats operate under similar requirements. The CubeSat design 
uses standard interface documentation to ensure build requirements are followed. The P-
Pod requirements ensure limited impact to launch vehicle power and are transparent to 
the primary payload. The standardization requirements mandate that the CubeSats are not 
active during ascent. Once the deployment sequence is initiated, a deployment switch 
then activates the power. The system also must be tested to ensure vibration stability and 
thermal vacuum bake-out to ensure proper out gassing.  The mission of the Cal Poly 
CubeSat program is to strive to provide practical, reliable, and cost-effective launch 
opportunities for small satellites and their payloads. To do this, they provide the 
community with the following. 
• A standard physical layout and design guidelines 
• A standard, flight proven deployment system (P-Pod) 
• Coordination of required documents and export licenses, if launching 
through Cal Poly 
• Integration and acceptance testing facilities with formalized schedules 
• Shipment of flight hardware to the launch site and integration to LV 




The P-Pod’s primary focus is for safe housing of the CubeSats and assurance that 
they operate on a noninterference basis with the primary payload and the launch vehicle. 
CubeSats have produced great advancements in laboratory and technological programs 
by enabling payloads with low-level TRLs to be flown aboard a CubeSat. This allows 
programs to increase “the potential return for developers by providing on-orbit 




Figure 16.   Complete CUBESAT 
The P-Pod and the ESPA Ring both act as facilitators behind satellite 
development. By creating a standard with which the satellites must adhere to for flight, 
standardization can be achieved and repeatable results can be attained. The P-Pod 
controls the CubeSat specifications by design. The system is a canister that holds one to 
three CubeSats with a total dimension of 10cm x 10cm x 30cm. By creating a canister 
design, the SV providers cannot push the specifications past the acceptable margins. If 
the canister is greater than the 10cm x 10cm x 30cm dimension, then it will not fit. The 
ESPA ring offers more flexibility for launch opportunities but also creates a dimensional 





Figure 17.   CUBESAT Variants 
The P-Pod was developed with seven primary goals: [53] 
• Protect the primary payload 
• Protect the launch vehicle 
• Protect the CubeSats 
• Safely group multiple CubeSats for launch 
• Eject CubeSats for safe deployment 
• Increase Access to Space for CubeSats 
• Provide standard interface to launch vehicle 
Newman [54] states that the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is investigating 
DoD provided launch opportunities. This investigation will enable the CubeSat launcher 
to be placed aboard a government mission.  In 2012, the National Reconnaissance Office 
will be launching a classified mission from Vandenberg AFB.  The mission will fly with 
the ABC structure on the aft end of the Centaur upper stage that will carry the NPSCuL.  
NPSCuL was created by the Naval Postgraduate School and was developed as a multiple 
launcher configuration. The NPSCuL standard can carry up to 10 P-Pod deployers, 
whereas the Lite variant can carry up to eight deployers.  The NPSCuL and NPSCuL-Lite 




compatible with the ESPA ring. “In addition to the ESPA, NPSCuL-Lite is compatible with 
other secondary payload adapters, such as the new Aft Bulkhead Carrier (ABC) adapter being 
developed for Atlas V launch vehicles” [55]. Newman states, “the CubeSat is seeing 
growing acceptance in educational and research institutions due to its small size and 
relatively low cost and can provide NPS students with useful, short turnaround 
educational projects in satellite engineering and operations. CubeSat also show potential 
for us in rapid-prototyping and low-cost flight testing of advanced materials and systems 
and certain research payloads [54].” This flexibility allows the launcher to be attached to 
an ESPA mission and deploy 10–30 dedicated separate missions from just one attachment 
port on the system. This simple design and tight tolerance for the systems center of mass 
allows for it to be quickly integrated into the primary mission.  If an ESPA secondary 
payload does not meet launch date, then another ESPA system can slide into the open slot 
and continue with the total system launch process.  
 
Figure 18.    NPSCuL-Lite 
C. AEROSPACE CORPORATION SOLUTION INTEGRATION FOR ESPA 
The Aerospace Corporation is a Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center (FFRDC), which is a nonprofit organization funded by the U.S. government to 
support programs with scientific research, analysis, and system acquisitions. Its research 




pursuit of project understanding and success. To address the ESPA standardization 
concerns, Aerospace has been appointed as lead in identifying and resolving the mission 
integration issues. Aerospace is working to assist with the development of the EELV 
RUG and the Standard APL-ESPA-LV ICD documentation. Table 1 shows Aerospace’s 
assessment of the current state compared to the way-ahead plan for the ESPA program 
[56]. 
 
MISSION ELEMENT CURRENT STATE WAY AHEAD PLAN 
APL Qualification, 
Modeling, and Verification 
Data 
►Varied APL qualification 
approaches required extra 
effort to evaluate for 
compatibility w/LV 
environments  
►Lack of qualification 
standards to assure APL-LV 
compatibility 
►Establish EELV Rideshare Specification 
with APL design requirements and 
qualification standards to assure 
compatibility with co-passengers and LV 
Mission Interfaces ►Custom LV interfaces 
tailored to support APL 
requirements 
Variable interfaces & 
mission unique services 
►Establish Standard APL-ESPA-LV ICD 
to eliminate APL interface variability 
►Require APL to demonstrate compliance 
to standard ICD 
SV Separation Systems & 
Attach H/W 
►Variability in APL 
provided separation systems 
do not consistently assure 
mission compatibility & 
reliability 
►Separation system re-
design and additional 
qualification testing may be 
necessary 
►LVC provide qualified critical flight 
hardware (separation systems, ESPA, 
harnesses, etc) with LVC assurance of 
reliable functionality 
Mission Integration ►Multiple APL integration 
is very complex and 
challenging due to dissimilar 
requirements, interfaces, 
designs, & varied APL 
schedules 
►Mission analyses 
approach not integrated with 
APL payload variability 
►Single mission integration agent for the 
entire stack is more efficient as incremental 
effort to primary mission 
►LVC systems engineering responsibility 
provides additional assurance of mission 
success 
 
Launch Operations Obtaining PPF facilities at 
launch site for APL 
processing is a major 
challenge 
LVC to provide PPF for APL final 




MISSION ELEMENT CURRENT STATE WAY AHEAD PLAN 
Schedule Current LV integration lead 
times are too long to support 
APL mission Schedules—
process geared for primary 
mission only 
Redesign a process to permit APL launch 
assignment at L-24 
Develop capability to permit APL re-
assignment as late as L-12 months 
Cost APL integration cost is very 
high if performed like a 
primary mission 
High cost →Unused 
capacity 
Cost reductions realized through interface 
& work scope standardization to reduce 
effort associated with APL missions 
Table 1.   Aerospace’s Assessment of ESPA Processing 
This comprehensive approach is designed to ensure a thorough understanding by 
all parties from development, planning, construction, and launch. This process reduces 
mission risks and ensures proper foresight is involved. With Secretary Gates’ focus on 
reducing costs and finding answers to acquisition overruns, the activities performed by 
Aerospace will bring about a process that embraces incremental developmental activities 
and reduced costs.  
1. Future Progress 
Aerospace laid the foundation of the way forward by phasing the development for 
the ESPA activities. Four phases remain in Aerospace’s vision for future success. Phase 
2a is the next step in the process. This phase focuses on maturing the processes 
established and verified through the STP-1 mission into an engineering implementation 
plan. This creation of baseline work allows the STP office and the LVC to gain an 
accurate understanding of the work scope required for each APL and the missions as a 
whole. Furthermore, the work scope is allowing set standards and firm pricing models to 
be established making the marketability of the system better understood and embraced by 
potential APL programs. This phase also focuses on the launch manifests and the 
integration of the ESPA system on future missions based around excess margin. The 
current launch manifests track the progress of each mission and queue them into a 
forecast based upon mission readiness and availability of launch vehicles. By detailing 




requirements and assignments can be made determining the best fit. With a desire to be 
more flexible, steps are being inserted into this phase to allow software, hardware, and 
payload changes as soon as Launch minus 12 months out (L-12). This standardization 
and preplanning will create a better responsive space system than the standard 24–36 
month process.  
Phase 2b is a concurrent process with Phase 2a but focuses on the documentation 
and written standardizations, making all parties better versed with the process ensuring 
compliance. In this phase, the development, approval, and publication of the ESPA RUG, 
and Standard ICD are completed. These two documents alone explain the steps 
performed and requirements by all parties.  
Phases 3 and 4 are reserved for the mission kit development and fabrication. 
These phases continue to document the actual missions, which the ESPA ring is currently 
manifested on, allowing early flight designs. The DMSP-19 mission is manifested to 
carry the first Air Force operational ESPA adapter. This polar orbit satellite will be ideal 
for secondary payloads due to the low orbit and advantage for earth imaging, mapping, 
and sun synchronous missions.  
2. Changing the Paradigm 
Aerospace’s alternate role is advocacy for the program. Support is always 
required for any program to succeed. By working with ULA, Aerospace hopes to assist 
with required changes allowing mission partners to better understand the processes ULA 
needs to prepare and execute missions. By developing a complete requirement set and 
issuing standardized flight hardware, a twofold approach of eliminating performance 
uncertainty and assuring mission compatibility will be achieved. By standardizing the 
processes, not only will mission integration be smoother, but also the integration process 
itself can continue to be redefined allowing improvements and flexibility to be achieved. 
Achieving flexibility not only reduces bottlenecks in the process, but it also creates 
missions, which are more conducive to an ORS environment. Some goals within the 




reducing the timeline required, a more responsive launch manifest can be built allowing 
for rapid call-up of secondary payloads. Integration challenges pose the greatest barrier 
for successful realization of an ESPA standardized launch service. Two main drivers 
improve integration issues. The first is establishing integration “gates,” which would 
allow oversight of the processes by grading the auxiliary payloads on their adherence. 
This consistency in the process would allow for an improved process and bottleneck 
reduction. The second integration challenge is to reduce integration costs. Integration 
activities are very expensive and could be a challenge for small programs to fund. By 
standardizing the costs and creating a fixed price approach, more entrants would emerge. 
Many universities would be able to advocate for funding if they had fixed prices to 
request. By establishing launch industry confidence in the processes, all parties would be 
more apt to approve an ESPA ring on more and more missions.  
3. The Vision 
Standard ESPA launch services will offer many benefits and have processes 
driven around accomplishing six visionary achievements.   These achievements are: 
• The first achievement is to provide frequent and regular launch 
opportunities to desired orbits with known capacities. The ESPA system is 
built upon this foundation. Having STP review the launch manifest for 
excess margin, missions will be tagged as ESPA capable and be 
configured with the ESPA ring, opening the mission to secondary 
payloads. This early awareness and orbit determination allows STP to 
match-mate early in the integration process so APL program managers 
have time to schedule the workflow.  
• The second achievement is to shorten the lead time to enable near-term 
APL flight assignments and later APL swaps in the integration process. 
Following the guidelines set forth in the ESPA RUG and establishing clear 
communication lines early in the development process, shortened lead 




• The third achievement targets launch costs reduction from a typical single 
missions price ranging from $7–10M per SV to about $500K for a 
rideshare.  This reduction would establish an inexpensive ride that would 
cover the integration and hardware support for each mission [57].  “The 
recurring cost for the ESPA units is estimated at $600,000 plus $50,000 
for each secondary payload isolation system (if needed) [57].” The 
integration costs are already low, and then the cost spread between six 
missions drives the price into the realm where many small programs and 
universities can afford a ride. 
• The fourth achievement is a policy that ensures no impact to the primary 
payload. This standardized launch service is intended to be aboard the 
majority of all EELV missions, and by operating in a manner which the 
primary payload performs testing and integration with an ESPA ring 
attached to the upper stage, the remainder of activities will be transparent 
and present no impacts to the primary payload.  
• The fifth achievement is a culture change that builds in mission assurance 
into all aspects of the undertaking. Major General Pawlikowski explained 
mission assurance as both a process and culture in her article titled 
Mission Assurance—A Key Part of Space Vehicle Launch Mission Success 
[2]. She stated, “as a process, mission assurance is an iterative, continuous, 
technical, and management activity employed over the entire life cycle of 
a launch system to achieve confidence in mission success” [2]. As a 
culture, she noted, “each individual must assume personal accountability 
and responsibilities both to perform successfully their part of the mission 
and to work collaboratively with others to ensure the process functions as 
a whole” [2]. This mindset of a set process and cultural responsibility 






Nothing about launch vehicles can be performed without a set methodical 
approach to best practices. Mission success is built around following and 
utilizing lessons learned.  
• The sixth achievement to make ESPA rings successful is the establishment 
of matching the Atlas V and Delta IV capability. By creating a truly dual 
capable system, swaps cannot only be performed from mission to mission, 
but also from vehicle to vehicle allowing more options, more 
responsiveness, and more flexibility.  
These six achievements, although currently just a vision for the system, are within 
reach if given support from leadership in government and industry.  By leveraging the 
experience, history, and knowledge from the leaders in the industry, the current 
achievements can become instilled into the process and a standardized launch service 
offering rapid call up and limited impact can be possible. Since the rideshare is pushing 
technology and allowing less experienced entrants to the launch support mission area, 
assistance must be offered to ensure APLs understand their responsibilities and 
milestones ensuring the auxiliary payloads are in compliance with the requirements.  
D. ASSISTANCE FOR AUXILIARY PAYLOADS DEVELOPERS 
Understanding the audience is the first step to offering assistance for rideshare. 
Offering this capability to universities and small programs means giving them the tools 
required to perform smooth integration and testing of their payload. By standardizing the 
launch service, mission hardware kits can be developed giving them the interface upon 
which they can build the satellite. With the interface and umbilical hardware being 
offered, the ESPA RUG and the ICD will become the foundation of adherence.  
1. EELV Mission Kit Hardware 
To assist in the development of secondary satellites, a kit is being developed that 
will standardize the process for APLs. This standardized kit will aid the homogeny 
between the APL-ESPA-LV ICD. The hardware consists of the ESPA, ESPA-LV 




instrumentation, and ground support equipment. The “nonstandard” APL requirements 
are considered mission unique items that the APL programs must supply. Some 
nonstandard requirements, which might be required by the APL, are power, hydrazine, 
and helium.  
The LVC will provide engineering services and facilitate the process by providing 
the recurring APL integration analyses and support. The recurring launch site processing 
of hardware and integrated prelaunch operations will also be offered through the LVC. 
The Astrotech Payload Processing Facility at the Cape Canaveral Air Station is being 
used for many of the integration efforts.  
2. EELV Rideshare Specification 
EELV Secondary Payload Adapter Rideshare User Guide (ESPA RUG) is the 
single most important tool to inform the APL providers about their requirements in 
designing and fitting within the standardized parameters [58]. This document is being 
written by ULA and Aerospace and outlines the APL design criteria and requirements. 
The document should be viewed as the principal technical manual in the development of 
the APL by the program due to its ability to drive acceptance or denial of flight aboard an 
ESPA configured launch. Three focus areas within the document step future payload 
providers through the process. The guidance will be used to ensure a seamless transition 
from satellite development to mission integration. The three areas are mission 
requirements, environments, and ESPA secondary payload interface.  
The mission requirements area assigns the APL to a future mission based on a 
comparison of the primary payload’s orbital insertion and the APL’s orbital insertion 
based on mission needs. The orbit required is based on the orbital elements of each 
mission’s requirements and a best match is identified. An example is the desire for a 
polar orbit mission vice an equatorial orbit mission. Once a suitable upcoming mission 
has been identified, the remainder of the mission area sets the stage for informational 
understanding of launch processing from vehicle separation, collision avoidance 




The environments section defines the specific satellite and space environment for 
payload processing, transporting, and RF emissions during launch and early orbit. This 
sections answers most questions initially asked by a spacecraft developer to assist with 
gaining a better understanding of the environment the APL will experience from mate to 
vehicle separation allowing subsystems and proposed components to be chosen to 
maximize the APL success. This section also shows the great extent the LVC goes 
through to ensure compliance and acceptance of APLs. This verification through testing 
and technical documentation is typically beyond the capabilities of most programs and 
assists the APL along the development and execution process. This section also defines 
the APLs “rules of engagement” by explaining what can and cannot be activated prior to 
APL separation. The APL must be powered off with no transmitting of data and no direct 
power connection between the APL and launch vehicle. The design of the APL must also 
be considered in regards to materials used to take out-gassing and total mass loss of 
condensable matter into consideration. The specification also describes gravitational 
forces, acoustics, vibrations, shock and thermal heating to assist the APL to design a their 
satellite, detailing how sturdy the satellites must be to survive and not risk injury or 
failure to the mission as a whole. 
The ESPA secondary payload interface section describes the ESPA ring structure 
and the orientation of the coordinate system in relation to the Secondary Standard 
Interface Plane (SSIP). The approved dimensions for APL systems is 38”x28”x24” and 
can be increased due to some mission unique requirements at the approval of ULA. The 
interface used for attachment to the ESPA ring is through a circular ring with a diameter 
of 15 inches. The LVC will also supply the separation system, which is the Planetary 
Systems Corporation’s 15” Lightband Separation System. APLs must also comply with 
the Air Force Space Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91–710, Volumes 1, 3, and 6 and 
will rely upon a sponsoring agency to demonstrate compliance. Lithium-ion batteries 





Together, these three sections set the basis upon which all current and future 
mission success will be measured. If properly followed, a trend can be set in development 
to allow the ESPA systems to be more successful and ensure future missions operate at a 
responsive state with faster call-up times.  
3. Standard APL-ESPA-LV ICD  
The ESPA ring drives four new requirements that add to the current Interface 
Control Documents (ICD). These requirements offer increased compliance and 
documentation to facilitate redundant processes for follow-on launches. With so many 
communities interested in developing APL satellites, a standardized ICD removes the fog 
of mission development and requests specific adherence to requirements. The four 
additional requirements build upon the currently successful ICD process and make a 
predictable progression from initial notification to mission integration. The first is the 
establishment of standard APL-ESPA-LV interface to eliminate mission variability. The 
second is the mechanical and electrical pass thru provisions for primary LV interface. 
The third is the Launch Vehicle Contractor (LVC) performance of the analyses as needed 
to substantiate interface design and flight envelope. The fourth is the Mission ICD, which 
is composed of the APL-ESPA-LV ICD and the Primary-LV ICD. The conjoining of 
documentation creates one master ICD. Reducing the integration time will make the 
system more responsive to space efforts allowing integration capabilities to touch the 
ORS focused initiatives to fewer than 12 months. Syncing up the APL systems with the 
Atlas V and Delta IV allow launch vehicles to be more flexible, providing greater 
successes with each mission. 
E. SUMMARY 
By taking the lessons learned from CubeSat and applying them to the ESPA 
program, much efficiency can be gained allowing the ESPA program to learn and build 
from prior program’s experiences.  Integration activities of the ESPA and APL are where 
these documented lessons will be most beneficial to program managers and system 




a more inclusive approach will be realized, using the current processes and applying a 
more precise plan for the system.  Marking future missions as viable candidates for ESPA 
rings will lock missions into the manifest and get the program one step closer to 
achieving their goal of orbital operations.  The mission kit is another offered incentive to 
make it possible and more simplistic for APLs to merge with the launch community. 
With the changing paradigms and visions in place, a more affordable approach can be 
offered to research and development programs, along with giving limited funded 









V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW OF EELV AND THE ESPA SYSTEM 
This thesis began with one simple question; can the ESPA ring be so clearly 
defined and implemented that it becomes nearly transparent to the primary payload, 
making integration simple enough to gain program manager support and offer more 
frequent research and scientific missions to orbit?  The answer is “yes” and with the 
ESPA RUG and ICD, it can be accomplished.   
The ESPA ring’s requirements are clearly defined and implemented so all parties 
will be able to develop the desired LV-SV-APL integration approach making it nearly 
transparent to the primary payload.  The total sum approach makes integration simple 
enough to gain program manager support, offering more frequent research and scientific 
missions to orbit.  With the top-down approach coming from leadership and the buy-in by 
the aerospace community, the program manager will continue to develop an appreciation 
for the desire to fly ESPA aboard all available missions with sufficient margin. The 
lessons learned from the difficulties in space acquisition are numerous, and gaining a 
better understanding of the current state of acquisitions and requirements will allow 
decision makers to implement novel ideas to improve upon the current and clearly broken 
acquisition process.  
Taking into account space operation complexities, high developmental costs, and 
low launch rates, better decisions can be made through maximizing the use of launch 
vehicle margin for the purpose of advancing technology, which will ultimately result in 
shortened acquisition schedules. The 2001 Space Commission noted that, “to achieve 
national security objectives and compete successfully internationally, the U.S. must 
maintain technological leadership in space. This requires a healthy industrial base, 
improved science and technology resources, an attitude of risk-taking and innovation, and 
government policies that support international competitiveness. In particular, the 
government needs to significantly increase its investment in breakthrough technologies to 




approaches that reduce significantly the cost of building and launching space systems. 
The U.S. will not remain the world’s leading space-faring nation by relying on 
yesterday’s technology to meet today’s requirements at tomorrow’s prices [19].” 
With the simple design, strict requirements, and non-interference basis approach, 
the ESPA system offers a new realm within which innovative advancements, small 
satellites, and TRLs can continue to advance U.S. systems by offering operationally 
verified systems. The initial beginnings have had upper level leadership support, while 
program managers hesitate with the idea of adding complexity to their systems. Due to 
the success of STP-1 and LCROSS, the future looks promising delivering more 
opportunities for ESPA to continue to show the benefits of flying secondary missions.  
GAO studies, which followed acquisition programs through maturity, learned that 
five of six space systems (when cost estimates were developed) had program officials and 
cost estimators who believed that the technology critical to program success would be 
mature and available. This belief proved to be incorrect and resulted in a realization that 
the technology issues ended up being more complex than initially understood, resulting in 
cost, schedule and technical overruns. For example, on the NPOESS program, DoD and 
the Department of Commerce committed funds for the development and production of 
satellites before the technology was mature. It was later determined that only one of 14 
critical technologies were mature at program initiation and one technology was 
determined to be even less mature than initially thought after the contractor conducted 
more verification testing. The program has since been beset by significant cost increases 
and schedule delays due in part to technical problems, such as the development of key 
sensors, which was one reason why the program was dissolved. Thus, the DoD and 
Weather community must now go their own way in developing separate weather satellite 
constellations.  
“For the GPS IIF program, the cost estimate was built on the assumption that the 
military code signal being developed would fit on a single microchip. However, once 
development started, interface issues arose and the subcontractor had to move to a two-




[59].” In hindsight, these easy to comprehend issues seem to be simple to fix; however, 
the solutions and technology evolutions, which finally restored the acquisition approach, 
came too late and with too much of a cost overrun to continue justifying the exorbitant 
cost overruns, resulting in some systems experiencing Nunn-McCurdy breaches and even 
project termination.  
The ESPA system continues to prove its benefits to the scientific community by 
providing more opportunities for on orbit research opportunities.  These opportunities can 
be used to advance the technical readiness of many payload components.  With each 
mission’s determination to use an ESPA system, great results are produced justifying the 
implementation onto future missions. With each success, comes greater support, which 
validates the utility of the simple design. Turning this flight proven system into a 
standard integration item is the next challenge for ULA, LRSD, and SDTD. With 
continued leadership support, APL adherence to integration requirements and successful 
missions, future manifests can represent a whole suite of launches packed with multiple 
missions and results benefiting a much larger community, evolving technology and 
gaining a better understanding of ideas, which are only in theory, due to the ability to 
provide low-cost orbital insertion and true testing in the operational environment of 
space.  
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT DIRECTION 
From the frequent Nunn-McCurdy breaches in space programs to the continual 
negative perception placed on developing space programs in the defense community, it is 
time for a change and time for acquisition programs to verify capabilities prior to contract 
awards. The old mindset of overstating requirements and underestimating costs to ensure 
program approval must end. With the current trend of billion dollar programs doubling or 
tripling, space programs might find themselves in a situation that a follow-on system will 
become impossible to afford and even justify. The reins must be pulled in, and it is a 
necessity that cost and schedule be accurately planned and followed throughout the life 
cycle of the systems. U.S. leadership is also noting, “Significant cost growth and 




Intelligence Community leadership to question our nation’s ability to acquire and sustain 
national security space systems [60].” Not only did the concerns get noted, but also, the 
threats have been put into effect by canceling programs. Space Radar, TSAT, SBIRS, and 
NPOESS are just a few of the space programs that have either been canceled or had their 
requirements slashed in an attempt to reduce the hemorrhaging of funds and delays.  
On 1 February 2010, the White House sent a message loud and clear to the 
NPOESS program when it ended the “troubled civil-military weather satellite program 
[61].” The decision has been made that NPOESS will no longer stand as a single 
program, but will instead be two separate satellites systems serving military and civilian 
users. “The NPOESS program has for years been plagued with cost overruns and delays, 
and the program’s tri-agency management structure has been cited as a major contributor 
to the problem [61].” As these programs learn all too late, “the chief reason for 
developmental problems is the encouragement within the acquisition environment to 
attempt overly ambitious and lengthy product developments, which are referred to as 
revolutionary or big bang acquisition programs that embody too many technical 
unknowns and not enough knowledge about the performance and production risks they 
entail [62].” With the mostly unwanted interest in the managing of space programs, the 
areas of concern have been flagged and can now begin to be questioned or verified for 
technical readiness. For programs that have too many components with low TRLs, the 
ESPA ring can provide opportunities for relatively low cost on-orbit component tests to 
help avoid the problems described above.    
C. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Having all parties working together and following the established requirements 
laid out in the ESPA RUG and ICD, the integration difficulties can be relieved and a safe 
consistent process can be repeated allowing the high cost of launch to bring more benefits 
to multiple programs and users.  With the STP-1 mission, there were many first time 
integration challenges and even first time maneuver requirements for the Centaur upper 
stage.   Even as a first flight, it was clear to see the benefits outweighed the challenges, 




vehicle costing approximately $90M.  That single launch would be equivalent to seven 
launches spanning a year’s worth of launches on the EELV manifest and costing 
approximately $700M in launch vehicle cost.   
 Directing APLs to develop a mass simulator early in the process mitigates the 
problems associated with a secondary payload missing the mission.  These simulators 
allow developers to continue working on their SV issues much closer to the launch date, 
keeping the primary payload and remaining secondary payloads moving towards launch.   
 ESPA operates with the goal of not interfering with the primary payload and has 
established requirements making this possible. There are many strict requirements in the 
ESPA RUG and ICD on how the SV must be built which further facilitates this 
noninterference.   The systems must be deactivated during integration and ascent. In 
addition, by laying out the specific “box” dimensions that a secondary payload must fit 
within, the integration standardization process is much easier for the APL program.  To 
ensure additional safety, the primary payload is always separated first, and then the upper 
stage moves away from the primary payload’s orbit prior to beginning deployment of the 
secondary payloads.  
 The successful STP-1 mission and the LCROSS mission opened new doors of 
understanding into what acceleration potentials can be achieved for future missions 
demanding a more ORS approach.  With the standardization and lessons learned, more 
focus will be placed on orbital loads allowing for more rapid software development 
creating a much more ORS friendly responsiveness. The mass simulator, early integration 
and loads analysis, lessons learned, and more interested participants will allow for a “hot 
spare” approach to be realized.  This backup is just one of the benefits already discussed 
in the ORS community.     
D. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
This thesis discussed the historical and current acquisition of space programs and 
launch operations of the United States. The primary goal is to develop a better 




TRLs, and flexibility for current and future acquisition programs. Future study into costs, 
orbital dynamics, flight loads, and manifesting missions should be further studied to 
clarify and standardize the strict requirements placed on secondary payloads. With 
continued research, proven missions, and rideshare forums, progress can be made to 
better develop cost models and flight loads making ESPA integration more seamless.  
This thesis is not an attempt to say orbital dynamics and loads are simple or 
without challenges when integrating an ESPA system, but it is intended to indicate that it 
is possible; that the challenges are outweighed by the benefits each mission success 
brings to the scientific community and DoD. Research is ongoing in the challenging areas 
of flight dynamics and manifesting. These areas require further research, and they 
themselves are worthy of countless thesis and research topics.  
Although much research has been accomplished to have the ESPA system proven, 
more is still required to make it affordable, regular, and standardized. The following ideas 
are recommended for consideration based on the research conducted in this thesis.  
• Enforce standardization issues early in the process 
Beginning with a solid foundation of requirements and enforcing a strict 
standardization approach, APLs will gain the respect required to earn a position on future 
missions.  
• Enable secondary payload programs to participate in the requirements 
process  
When reviewing secondary payload proposals, all participants will understand the 
benefits the research will provide. In addition, the primary payload developer can provide 
details about the requirements process and the schedule so all secondary payload 
developers can be prepared for the launch at the planned date.   
• Open the launch manifest to welcome secondary payloads by flagging 




With launch manifesting occurring typically five to three years before launch, 
flagging available margin early on will allow payload providers ample time to develop 
and follow the required documents.  
• Create an environment in which program managers see it as their duty to 
search for and support missions with available margin to support 
secondary payloads 
Removing the prototype stigma from the ESPA ring and making standard 
integration hardware will allow program managers to view the ESPA ring as just another 
requirement in the launch service. 
• Continue to improve upon team communication 
The space industry is large and diverse. More communication and openness of all 
parties will allow for greater innovation.  
• Prove technology maturity in operational environment 
The final goal of most laboratory research is to test the system in the operational 
environment. By making low-cost rideshare avenues available, many programs that 
would never garner the opportunity to enter space will now find themselves achieving 
orbit and taking their research to new levels of technology readiness. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter is intended to leave the reader with final thoughts and considerations 
into the benefits offered by integrating an ESPA onto future missions. An appreciation of 
the acquisition challenges facing many programs can be overcome by progressing TRLs 
prior to contract awards and source selections. The lessons learned from failed programs 
are extensive and most areas points to the benefits an ESPA ring offers. The GAO has 
extensively reported requirements, which if followed early in the system life cycle, will 
result in greater chances of success. As noted, this thesis is not an attempt to dig deep into 





weight and center of gravity. However, if early manifesting is accomplished, and APLs 
follow the required procedures, early integration efforts will allow smooth transitions 
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